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Institutional Means-ends Decoupling Work in Industrial 
R&D Project Implementation  
 
Highlights 
 
Managing goals is a key network management function and is critical in the 
implementation of industrial R&D projects.  
 
Shows how means-ends decoupling work maintains project implementation gaps, while 
simultaneously complying with the institutional regime. 
 
Sheds insights into the micro-mechanism drivers of institutional means-ends decoupling 
work. 
 
Highlights the plasticity of institutions as a result of competent actors ‘working smart’ in 
the R&D project implementation gap. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Institutional Means-ends Decoupling Work in Industrial 
R&D Project Implementation 
 
Abstract 
Managing goals is a key network management function and is critical in the implementation of 
industrial R&D projects. In this paper, we explore the implementation of an industrial R&D 
project, focusing in particular upon the role of means-ends decoupling work to understand how 
the goals are managed. We combine several data sources in our case research to explore project 
implementation through an understanding of means-ends decoupling work. We collected in-
depth interviews, archival records and field observations within the R&D research setting of an 
industrial R&D project in the period of 2015 to 2017. Our findings identify three types of 
means-ends decoupling work in R&D project implementation: ‘work on’ causal complexity, 
‘work at’ behavioural invisibility, and ‘work with’ practice multiplicity. In addition, we uncover 
six dynamic micro-mechanisms that collectively influence the making and nature of means-
ends decoupling work and therefore serve to allow for the fluid switching of work as the 
institutional conditions permit. Overall, our findings have significant implications for 
understanding means-ends decoupling as a highly skilled network competence for managing 
R&D project implementation goals. 
 
Keywords 
Means-ends decoupling, micro-mechanisms, institutional theory, industrial R&D projects, 
implementation.  
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Institutional Means-ends Decoupling Work in Industrial 
R&D Project Implementation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Industrial research and development (R&D) projects are intentionally created business 
networks. Such networks are defined as goal-oriented, value-creating systems (Matinheikki et 
al., 2016; Medlin & Törnroos, 2014; Möller & Rajala, 2007). These business networks require 
managers to mobilize or influence a wide range of industrial R&D actors through relationships 
to achieve goals (Mouzas & Naudé, 2007; Aarikka-Stenroos et al. 2017).  However, industrial 
R&D projects often require multi-sectoral collaboration (Rampersad, Quester, & Troshani, 
2010), or involve public and private actors (e.g., Reypens, Lievens, & Blazevic, 2016). 
Furthermore, an array of R&D market institutions also shape R&D project collaboration, 
including funding authorities (Perkmann et al., 2013); environmental authorities (Ngugi et al., 
2010), as well as project sponsors (Raasch & Hippel, 2013). While the involvement of diverse 
networks is essential for R&D activity, this also complicates management in terms of different 
goals, interests and pressures in project implementation (Aarikka-Stenroos et al., 2017; 
Matinheikki et al., 2016; Munksgaard & Medlin, 2014; Möller & Rajala, 2007; Baraldi & 
Strömsten, 2009).  
 
The management of goals is a key network function (Järvensivu & Möller, 2009). Industrial 
marketing studies show that the nature of relationship (e.g. asymmetric) and also the status and 
position within of networks (e.g. centralised hub firms) shape industrial business goals 
(Aarikka-Stenroos, et al. 2017; Matinheikki et al., 2016; Medlin & Törnroos, 2014). Other 
extant research points to the influence of implementation on business goals; this is, different 
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actors can implement work in different ways or differently to that which advocates had designed 
or intended (Rapert, Velliquette, & Garretson, 2002; Leischnig et al. 2017). Prior 
implementation research has demonstrated that ‘implementation gaps’ emerge as a result of 
firms failing to achieve the intended goals. Matinheikki et al., (2016) also find that differing 
goals result in resistance, inertia and tensions.   
 
In this paper, an institutional perspective is adopted to provide insights into how the work of 
network actors purposefully stretches existing institutional arrangements in order to support 
their work, while also accommodating different, sometimes competing or contradictory, 
pressures and goals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Strambach, 2010). In industrial marketing 
study, increasing recognition of how such pressures and goals are managed through decoupling 
work is emerging (Pressey & Vanharanta, 2016; Newton, Ewing & Collier, 2014; Yang & Su, 
2014).  Prior research on industrial cartels focuses mostly on symbolic policy decoupling, 
however (Pressey & Vanharanta, 2016; Pressey et al., 2014; Pressey & Ashton, 2009), while 
alternative types of decoupling in business markets remain unexplored and under researched. 
 
Two types of decoupling are commonly identified in the organisational literature (Bromley & 
Powell, 2012): In policy-practice decoupling, an organisation adopts policies to cope with 
external stakeholder pressures symbolically but does not implement these policies internally; 
and in means-ends decoupling, an organisation adopts and implements the policies but fails to 
achieve the intended goals. Taking examples from Wijen (2014), a case of policy-practice 
decoupling may be when an organisation adopts a chart of green policies to appear 
environmental-friendly to an external audience but does not incorporate the policies into its 
business activities and routines, which leads to a gap between policies and practices. In contrast, 
a case of means-ends decoupling may be illustrated when an organisation adopts and 
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implements the green policies but still fails to reduce its environmental footprint, which then 
leads to a gap between practices (means) and outcomes (ends). In this study, we argue for the 
importance of expanding the scope of decoupling from a work approach to understand the 
‘social skill’ of working in the implementation gaps and the making of those gaps. In this 
research, therefore, we focus on means-ends decoupling because, in comparison to the 
decoupling of policies and practices, the decoupling between firm practices (means) and 
outcomes (ends) has potentially a more critical impact on firms because it creates causal 
ambiguity between their actions and performance (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014, 
2015).  
 
The overall question of our study aims to address how compliant adopters, who follow clear 
inducements and are provided with sufficient resources, still fail to achieve the intended project 
goals? The specific objectives of the paper are twofold: i) to further develop an understanding 
of the nature of means-ends decoupling work, particularly with reference to an industrial R&D 
project implementation; ii) to identify how the micro-mechanisms dynamically influence 
means-ends decoupling work within an industrial R&D project implementation. Investigating 
this question is important as it seeks to identify some of the inherent, institutionally embedded 
causes and conditions, which consequently lead to the occurrence of means-ends decoupling 
within intentionally created business networks.  We selected a publicly funded industrial R&D 
project, which was financed by a national French funding scheme, as the field research setting 
for our case research. We combined in-depth interviews, archival records, and field 
observations from 2015 to 2017 as data sources to examine how the allocated resources and 
prevailing practices used to reach the intended project outcomes have instead resulted in the 
occurrence of means-ends decoupling. 
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Prior research has highlighted that discrepancies between firm practices and outcomes occur 
more frequently in opaque field conditions, not least because such fields that are characterised 
by a lack of transparent practices, absence of well-defined industry standards, or weak 
regulative pressures to sanction misconducts (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Crilly, Hansen, & 
Zollo, 2016; Wijen, 2014). Nowhere is this more evident than in R&D project implementation, 
where managers and stakeholders have difficulties in ascertaining a clear view of the various 
conditioning factors between practices and outcomes (Rapert, Velliquette, & Garretson, 2002; 
Leischnig et al. 2017). Furthermore, the industrial Market Studies approach have observed 
opacity in the emergence and construction of market innovation which blur the institutional 
view on linkages between practices, causality and performance (Hoholm & Olsen, 2012; 
Kjellberg & Helgesson, 2006). However, despite some early conceptual studies on theorizing 
means-ends decoupling (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014), few, if any, research studies 
investigate the subtle and incremental ways means-ends decoupling work advances or recedes 
in order to ensure that their implementation can effectively lead to the intended performance 
outcomes. 
 
In this study, we contribute to our understanding of the industrial marketing work in four distinct 
ways.  First, through our institutional decoupling work approach our study points to an 
understanding of the system-level goals, not as iron cages of work outcomes, but rather as a 
malleable network resource for accommodating business network diversity and providing the 
direction, maintenance and stability of R&D business networks (Medlin and Törnroos, 2014). 
In this regard, we identify three types of institutional means-ends decoupling – ‘work on’ causal 
complexity, ‘work at’ behavioural invisibility, and ‘work with’ practice multiplicity – which 
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permits network actors to purposefully stretch existing institutional arrangements in order to 
support their work, while also accommodating different, often competing or contradictory, 
system-level goal pressures (Aarikka-Stenroos et al., 2017; Matinheikki et al., 2016; 
Munksgaard & Medlin, 2014). 
 
The second contribution builds on Ritter’s (2006) notion that network competences such as task 
implementation (relationship specific vs. cross relational) in business networks. We 
demonstrate that there is a high degree of skilled agency required to stretch and accommodate 
the demands of R&D project implementation. In particular, we identify six distinct micro-
mechanisms, which underlie and constitute in their sum the higher-level process drivers of 
means-ends decoupling work. These six micro-mechanisms collectively influence the 
occurrence of means-ends decoupling and therefore serve to allow for the fluid switching of 
work as the institutional conditions permit.  Third, despite the importance of R&D project 
implementation work, most studies focus on marketing strategy implementation at an 
organizational or individual level of business exchanges. Building on calls to extend the firm 
as a unit of analysis (Pressey, Gilchrist, & Lenney, 2015; Yang & Su, 2014), our paper extends 
the industrial marketing literature in relation to an institutional understanding of R&D project 
implementation gaps (Blomquist & Wilson, 2007; Cova & Salle, 2007; Mele, 2011; Canhoto, 
Quinton, Jackson, & Dibb, 2016). As such we extends the industrial cartel research on symbolic 
policy adoption gaps (Pressey & Vanharanta, 2016; Pressey et al., 2014; Pressey & Ashton, 
2009) as well as Newton, Ewing, and Collier’s (2014) research on loose coupling. Overall, we 
shed light on micro-level rather macro-level institutional factors and on means-ends decoupling 
rather than policy-practice decoupling. 
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Finally, our study can build upon past market studies research where opacity is a characteristic 
of the emergence and construction of market innovation (Hoholm & Olsen, 2012; Kjellberg & 
Helgesson, 2006). Our findings show how such market opacity enables agency where traditional 
project rules do not always apply, where interplay and instability arise between industrial work 
and the outcomes of the R&D project. While prior studies often assume that the system goals 
remain intact, our findings demonstrate instead a high degree of institutional malleability. In 
sum, our study contributes to both the industrial marketing literature and the institutional theory 
by delineating how the combination of several micro-mechanisms results in the occurrence of 
means-ends decoupling work within an industrial R&D project.  
 
2. Theoretical Background 
We structured this theoretical background section into three parts. The first part provides an 
institutional analysis of the key themes on implementation, with particular focus on 
implementation gap, institutional work and concept of decoupling. In the second part, we   
elaborate the central tenets of means-ends decoupling and provide a conceptual definition of 
the micro-mechanisms concept. Finally, we summarise in the third part the key elements of 
compliance barriers and compliance inducements which are considered in R&D project 
implementation.  
 
2.1. An institutional analysis of implementation gaps in industrial fields 
Managing implementation goals is a key network function (Järvensivu & Möller, 2009). Despite 
extant research pointing to the importance of implementation on business goals, the current 
literature tells us surprisingly little about how multiple organizations can manage 
implementation goals (Matinheikki et al., 2016). A recent special issue by Möller and Parvinen 
(2015) on the theme of implementation highlighted several of the major challenges and 
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complexities of achieving goals (Leischnig et al., 2017). Möller and Parvinen (2015), and 
Leischnig et al. (2017) acknowledge these challenges, indicating that no matter how 
authoritative system-level goals or idiosyncratic goals are, these can be ‘challenged’ through 
day-to-day assaults on their validity (Matinheikki et al., 2016; Medlin & Törnroos, 2014; Möller 
& Rajala, 2007). In Table 1, we have summarized the three essential theoretical themes and 
their key arguments regarding the implementation.   
 
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Table 1 Summary of implementation themes relevant to the focus of the study 
------------ 
 
One explanation for this complexity relates to the rigid properties of institutions and how that 
does not always correspond well with the demands of implementation change.  This rigidity is 
observable in studies on task and relational conflict in industrial buyer-seller relationships 
(Hingley, 2005) and non-compliance towards specific rules of exchange (Bello et al., 2004). 
Here, the industrial marketing literature mostly views institutional environments (e.g. rules and 
regulations as well as social discourses about network roles and functions) as a set of barriers 
or obstacles to navigate in the adoption of new policy, technology or marketing initiative (Dibb 
& Simkin, 1994; Dibb, 1999; Leischnig et al., 2018). The challenge with this conception is that 
it focuses on the outcome of ineffective implementation, where goals are framed as achieved or 
not (Aarikka-Stenroos et al., 2017; Matinheikki et al., 2016). Whenever implementation goals 
are not achieved, therefore, research assumes the emergence of implementation gaps (Leischnig 
et al., 2017).   
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Business networks require managers to mobilize or influence a wide range of industrial R&D 
actors through relationships to achieve goals (Aarikka-Stenroos et al. 2017; Matinheikki et al., 
2016). Through relationships, social entities must be seen to be conforming to the norms and 
behavioral expectations to gain resources and the necessary legitimacy for survival (Newton, 
Michael, & Collier, 2014).  However, as Newton et al. (2014) note, this quest for legitimacy is 
often at the expense of efficiency and this trade-off can give rise to tensions in the demands 
made within or between social entities. Unlike institutional rigidity, recent research suggests 
existing institutional arrangements which can accommodate different, sometimes competing or 
contradictory, pressures and goals (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Strambach, 2010). This property 
of institutions – plasticity – is much less considered in industrial marketing. Strambach (2010) 
suggests that plasticity is the result of the work of actors that purposefully recombine and 
convert or reinterpret institutions for their new objectives or goals.  Recently, neo-institutional 
approaches have begun to ‘zoom in’ on what people actually do in institutions  – the ‘intelligent, 
situated institutional action’ (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006: 219).  This focus on work reverses 
the emphasis of how institutions govern action by exploring how actions affect institutions, 
especially the practical actions by which institutions are created, maintained and disrupted 
(Lawrence et al., 2013). To that end, Berk and Galvan (2009) argue that institutions should not 
be viewed as large systems that structure outcome, but as packets of practice that can be 
shuffled, rearranged, changed, or used habitually under different conditions.  
 
This institutional work perspective brings a more relational ontology to intentionally created 
business networks (i.e. R&D projects), one that flattens out implementation goals belonging to 
one group of actors (e.g. marketing department) and considers agency distributed across a range 
of actors (e.g. R&D project implementation), and across a network of organisational forms or 
incentive systems within the overarching institutional system (Song & Song, 2010; Huikkola et 
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al., 2013; Yao et al., 2014; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Reflecting this, industrial studies have 
shown how R&D implementation goals can be influenced by multi-sectoral collaboration 
(Rampersad, Quester, & Troshani, 2010), public and private logics (Reypens, Lievens, & 
Blazevic, 2016), R&D funding authorities (Perkmann et al., 2013); environmental authorities 
(Ngugi et al., 2010), as well as project sponsors (Raasch & Hippel, 2013). While the 
involvement of diverse networks is essential for R&D activity, this also complicates 
management in terms of different goals, interests and pressures in project implementation 
(Aarikka-Stenroos et al., 2017; Matinheikki et al., 2016; Munksgaard & Medlin, 2014; Möller 
& Rajala, 2007; Baraldi & Strömsten, 2009).  
 
Firms have different ways of dealing with the pressures of diverse network R&D activity and 
directing institutionally expected ‘allowed’ behaviour, for instance, setting up new divisions or 
projects (e.g. Skunkworks, R&D projects), and/or by adopting a new technology. These 
organisational structures can place familiar R&D actors in roles that will fit the institutional 
arrangement in order to facilitate implementation goals. However, increasing formalization of 
the R&D process by introducing more rules and regulations and stricter monitoring of R&D 
work can signal a greater emphasis on conformity to rules rather than achievement of creative 
goals. Overall, R&D research suggests institutional compromises, balancing a degree of 
strategic autonomy with discretionary oversight and the opportunity to deliver institutional 
goals (Feldman, 1984; Amabile & Gryskiewicz 1987). 
 
 
Decoupling work is commonly identified as a means to stretch certain institutional 
arrangements in order for the firm to buffer implementation, while also maintaining stability 
(Bromley & Powell, 2012): In policy-practice decoupling, an organisation adopts policies to 
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cope with external stakeholder pressures symbolically but does not implement these policies 
internally; and in means-ends decoupling, an organisation adopts and implements the policies 
but fails to achieve the intended goals (see Crilly et al., 2012; Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Greenwood et al., 
2011; King & Lenox, 2000; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Wijen, 2014). Institutional studies in industrial 
marketing explicitly highlight the role of policy-practice decoupling (Yang & Su, 2014), 
although there are comparatively few studies apart from initial research on industrial cartels 
(Pressey & Vanharanta, 2016; Pressey et al., 2014; Pressey & Ashton, 2009). Drawing on data 
from the European Union regulator for competition (the Directorate General for Competition), 
Pressey and Vanharanta (2016) show how this decoupling work, via industrial cartel price-
fixing networks, allow managers to deal with the pressures or demands from interested parties.  
 
The organisation literature research on decoupling (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967) 
indicates that organisational responses to external pressures, such as legislation, public policy, 
and social activism, usually resulted in internal buffering of daily practices from outside control 
and inspection. Such firms implemented these types of responses to decouple formal policies 
from their internal technical core and daily work routines (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In this 
regard, firms adopted policies as a response to external pressures, which related to formally 
stated legislation and regulation, while maintaining at the same time their actual internal 
practices unchanged (Scott, 2008). This literature therefore offers a number of important ideas 
with the potential to shed light on implementation work in industrial settings. In particular, 
while industrial marketing studies emphases a range of factors that hinder and help 
implementation, it also specifically points to the agentic role of individuals in bringing variation 
to the implementation processes. In the industrial marketing field, the question of misalignment 
has been framed in broad implementation gap terms (Möller & Parvinen, 2015). However, one 
of the weaknesses of the existing institutional analysis is how individuals work in the 
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implementation gaps and the making of those gaps. In the next section, we discuss in detail the 
relevant literature on means-ends decoupling work for our study. 
 
2.2. Tenets of means-ends decoupling work 
Means-ends decoupling work describes the gap that occurs in firms between the implementation 
of intended policies and the achievement of outcomes. Bromley and Powell (2012) and Wijen 
(2014) specify several conditions, which favour in their combination the occurrence of means-
ends decoupling. These conditions and factors comprise i), the existence of formal structures 
that have concrete consequences for organisational routines; ii) how managers implement and 
evaluate intended policies; and iii) how the firms change work activities but where there is little 
to no evidence which suggests a link to organisational outcomes and effectiveness. Internal 
constituencies within firms often have to deal with significant structural pressures in work 
activities. Thus, while they pursue certain work practices, they recognise that this work will 
have limited utility and a tenuous link to firm outcomes. Wijen (2014) argues that firms will 
often continue certain practices despite the knowledge that these activities do not link to 
organisational outcomes. 
 
Bromley and Powell (2012) argue that the theoretical lens of means-ends decoupling helps to 
address the pertinent question of why implementation work, standards, or institutions show at 
best ambiguous linkages to intended outcomes. Means-ends decoupling comprises work in 
which a firm adopts new aims that link only marginally to its core goals. Lyon and Maxwell 
(2011) state the example of petroleum firms, which embrace corporate social responsibility 
standards to protect their organisational legitimacy in societies that become increasingly critical 
to the adverse effects of the oil business. However, these corporate social responsibility 
standards do not logically relate to the core goals of petroleum firms.  
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However, while past research has provided insights into the organisational consequences of 
means-ends decoupling, the underlying micro-mechanisms, which manifest in the salient work 
(means) and outcomes (ends) remain largely unknown. We define in our study micro-
mechanisms as a systematic set of inferences of how different lower-level entities situated in an 
institutional context link together and become salient in higher-level phenomena. This 
definition of micro-mechanisms derives from prominent literature in philosophy of science, 
which emphasizes the importance to advance theory through gaining insights about entities at 
a different level, that is, the individual level of actors, than the overarching organizational 
entities being theorized (Mayntz, 2004; Hedström & Swedberg 1996; Stinchcombe, 1991). 
Strategic management and institutional theory literatures have recently adopted this research 
perspective and emphasized the importance of investigating the micro-mechanisms, which 
undergird the macro-level decisions and practices of organizations. Exemplary, Abell, Felin, 
and Foss (2008) specify that the explanatory mechanisms of higher-level organizational 
phenomena consist of bundles of individual actions and interactions. Consequently, the fine-
grained investigation of micro-level mechanisms improves substantially the understanding of 
macro-level decisions and behaviour (Foss, 2011; Felin & Foss 2006). 
 
Against this background of micro-mechanisms as sets of inferences of how different individual 
actions and interactions link together and become salient as means-ends decoupling  work on 
the collective level of the R&D project, we delineate in the remaining part of the background 
section compliance barriers and compliance inducements which potentially influence the 
occurence of means-ends decoupling work. The compliance barriers and compliance 
inducements provide in turn the central categories in which the micro-mechanisms surface and 
unfold. 
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2.3. Compliance barriers and compliance inducements influencing means-ends decoupling 
Building on Bromley and Powell’s (2012) research, Wijen (2014) summarises the conditions 
under which the adoption of practices, standards, and institutions leads to the achievement of 
the initially intended goals in relatively ‘opaque fields’. Using the case of voluntary 
sustainability programs, Wijen (2014) argues that the lack of field transparency, which is caused 
by ‘causal complexity’, ‘behavioural invisibility’, and ‘practice multiplicity’ leads institutions’ 
designers to set uniform rules, devise strong incentives, and promote transfer of best practices 
to ensure substantive compliance by adopters. However, the causal complexity and practice 
multiplicity, which characterise opaque fields, hinder the implementation of rigid institutional 
regimes, as they imply a trade-off between substantive compliance and goal achievement. 
 
Complementing the compliance barriers, Wijen (2014) suggests that 'setting rules', 'devising 
incentives', and 'transferring best practices' constitute three compliance inducements. The 
presence of the attention, knowledge, and motivation barriers in relatively opaque fields 
compels designers to elaborate institutions in ways that incentivize adopters’ compliant 
behaviour. These three compliance inducements enable institutional entrepreneurs to define a 
set of organisational measures which facilitate the achievement of intended goals. Table 2 
provides an overview of the compliance barriers and compliance inducements which potentially 
influence means-ends decoupling in organisations.  
 
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Table 2: Compliance barriers and compliance inducements influencing means-ends 
decoupling 
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------------ 
 
 
------------ 
 
Compliance barriers 
Organisations that operate in opaque fields, that is, contexts in which transparency is lacking, 
face difficulties to identify the characteristics of prevailing practices, establish causal links 
between policies and outcomes, and measure the exact outcomes of policy implementation 
(Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Jiang & Bansal, 2003). Wijen (2014) 
specifies that the existence of complex causal patterns, heterogeneous practices, and hardly 
visible behaviours results in three distinct compliance barriers. 
 
First, ‘causal complexity’ evolves in environments in which multiple heterogeneous actors, 
factors, and effects interact (Espinosa & Walker, 2011; Levy & Lichtenstein, 2012). Causal 
complexity leads in consequence to uncertainty and ignorance about cause-effect relations and 
the precise nature of an institutional field (Davis, Eisenhardt, & Bingham, 2009; Lindblom, 
1959; Milliken, 1987; Orton & Weick, 1990). The uncertainty and ignorance, which causal 
complexity provokes, result in turn in a lack of attention and knowledge about key drivers of 
substantive compliance (Ocasio, 1997). 
 
Second, ‘behavioural invisibility’ describes institutional environments, in which actors 
maintain a low profile (Spar & La Mure, 2003), refrain from accepting external control (Howard 
et al., 2000), and often locate in remote areas (O’Rourke, 2007). Behavioural invisibility 
exacerbates the difficulty to efficiently observe and measure actor behavior (Jiang & Bansal, 
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2003). When adopters of institutions pursue the strategy of non-compliance to avoid costly 
adaptation, behavioural invisibility allows them to conceal their non-compliant behavior and 
escape eventual sanctions (Aravind & Christmann, 2011). Behavioural invisibility thus leads to 
a lack of motivation for adopters to comply.  
 
Third, ‘practice multiplicity’ occurs when actors operating in an institutional field have to deal 
with a multitude of divergent practices and heterogeneous routines. In consequence, the 
multiplicity of practices makes it difficult for organisations to engage in compliant behaviour 
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Young, 2012). The ambiguity that stems from practice multiplicity 
leads to a lack of attention and knowledge about which one of the various coexisting practices 
results in substantive compliance. Taken together, the designers of practices, standards, and 
institutions need to overcome these three salient compliance barriers, and their resultant effects 
of the lack of attention, knowledge, and motivation, to ensure adopters’ substantive compliance. 
 
Compliance inducements 
The presence of the attention, knowledge, and motivation barriers in relatively opaque fields 
compels designers to elaborate institutions in ways that incentivise adopters’ compliant 
behavior. In the other side of the spectrum, Wijen (2014) suggests three compliance 
inducements to attenuate the compliance challenges which actors faced when they operate in 
non-transparent fields. 
 
First, ’setting rules’ counteracts the uncertainty and ignorance that stems from causal 
complexity, and that may cause actors not to pay due attention to the field-specific and relevant 
rules, aspects, and issues (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Okhmatovskiy & David, 2012). 
Therefore, when institutional designers set concrete and specific rules, directions, and 
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guidelines, they can counteract the causal complexity and increase the chance that adopters 
show compliance behaviour. 
 
Second, ‘devising incentives’ opposes the lack of motivation, which results from behavioural 
invisibility and threatens the effectiveness of institutions and benefits opportunistic adopters. 
To overcome this compliance barrier, designers need to create specific incentives and signal 
future benefits for compliant adopters (O’Rourke, 2007; King et al., 2005). 
 
Third, ‘transferring best practices’ counters the lack of attention and knowledge, that stems 
from practice multiplicity, which complicates the choice of adopters to select practices that lead 
to substantive compliance. To overcome this barrier, institutions should provide 
implementation options and enable capacity building through the transfer of best practices 
(Perez-Aleman, 2011; Terlaak, 2007). Given the presence of the attention, knowledge, and 
motivation challenges in relatively opaque fields, institutions’ designers need to develop and 
apply specific rules, devise strong incentives, and enable transfer of best practices to overcome 
the compliance barriers and thus ensure adopters’ substantive compliance.   
 
In sum, Bromley and Powell (2012) and Wijen (2014) argue that substantive compliance in 
relatively opaque fields may not lead to the achievement of the intended goals. We concur to 
this view and further extend it by advancing the idea that a set of micro-mechanisms underlie 
the gap between the means and ends. As such, we analyse our data through the lens of the three 
compliance barriers and compliance inducements. 
 
3. Methods 
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Our methodological design comprises the collection of qualitative data from in-depth interviews 
and complementary sources of evidence. This qualitative data gathering aims at establishing 
and extending theory in new and unexplored research fields (Creswell, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). 
 
3.1 Sample and Research Setting 
Our selected research setting for collecting data is the project "COI", which was launched and 
partially funded by France’s second largest high-technology cluster. This publicly funded 
industrial R&D project is driven by growing needs of people living in digital cities, to live 
original experiences that are highly rich in terms of collective emotions; particularly, within 
entertainment sectors such as cinemas, concerts, theatres, and other cultural and leisure realms. 
 
We selected the publicly funded industrial R&D project as our research setting for the following 
reasons. In the context of public funding schemes, selecting industrial R&D projects is a 
particularly challenging task for evaluators (Santamaría et al., 2010; Takalo & Tanayama, 
2010). Governmental agencies generally favour investments in research areas that can lead to 
achieving competitive advantages over time. Funding for such projects is often granted within 
the context of calls for projects across public research programs. Accordingly, governmental 
agencies thoroughly determine specific selection criteria that can help identify projects that 
meet the requirements of respective programs (Blanes & Busom, 2004). All information 
regarding the selection guidelines and criteria is available to R&D partners prior to the 
submission of their proposals. Given that the partners must comply with the strict requirements 
of R&D projects to qualify for funding, evaluators may be confronted with isomorphic 
proposals. As they have strong incentives to meet or even exceed the expectations of the 
constituencies involved in fund allocation, R&D partners may submit proposals that may not 
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reflect their actual capabilities. This strict selection process enforces guidelines and criteria that 
cause substantial pressures on R&D partners to conform. 
 
Accordingly, the project designers may set objectives for the project that conflict with 
partnering institutions’ core goals and that cannot be achieved by the partners given their actual 
resources and capabilities. For example, a recent guideline for a national call for projects, which 
funds industrial R&D projects in France, requires participating firms to display evidence of 
substantive market potential for new products or services. While R&D partners might conform 
to the requirement to provide market evidence by reporting large growth potential for future 
markets, their company’s core goals focus on targeting smaller markets that better fit their actual 
capabilities (Yang & Su, 2014). Bromley and Powell (2012) and Wijen (2014) argue that fields, 
in which organisations adopt policies and implement practices that are loosely linked to their 
core goals, are favourable for means-ends decoupling to occur.  
 
Moreover, the COI project fits the criteria of an opaque field, as it is characterized by a set of 
compliance barriers and inducements (Wijen, 2014). First, causal complexity is characterized 
by uncertainty and ignorance about the field specific rules and aspects, and the key drivers of 
substantive compliance. In the case of the industrial R&D project, COI, the ‘technical annex’ 
provides guidance and remedies improvisation. Such specific rules minimize the attention and 
knowledge problem caused by causal complexity and foster compliant behavior among the 
project partners. Second, behavioral invisibility allows actors to conceal their non-compliant 
behavior and escape eventual sanctions. Behavioral invisibility, thus, leads to a lack of 
motivation for adopters to comply. To overcome this motivation barrier the developers of 
institutions such industrial R&D projects signal that compliant partners can receive material 
benefits such as being selected for future projects and capturing value from the achieved 
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innovations. Finally, practice multiplicity leads to ambiguity and lack of knowledge about 
which one of the various coexisting practices results in substantive compliance. To overcome 
this barrier, the developers of the publicly funded industrial R&D projects offer implementation 
options and enable capacity building through transfer of best practices.  
Following this line of argumentation, we assume that publicly funded industrial R&D projects 
provide an appropriate setting to investigate our research question regarding the micro-
mechanisms underlying the gap between means (practices) and ends (outcomes). 
 
Description of the Setting  
The main goal of the COI project was to innovate experiences that allow extreme levels of 
immersion and interactivity among audiences in various entertainment sectors. Employing a 
number of state-of-the art-technologies including augmented reality, connected objects, 
immersion, interactivity, internet of objects, and high-quality transmission of audio-visual 
content, the project aims at innovating novel ways for entertaining people. The project 
consortium is composed of seven partners specialized in one of the latter technologies. Table 3 
summarises the partners’ fields of expertise.  
 
------------ 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Table 3: Participating Organisations in R&D Project Consortium 
------------ 
 
This project is run over a period of three years (January 2015 – July 2017). There are three main 
phases in this project: 1) phase 1 regards the launching of the project and the clarification of the 
outcomes expected to be achieved by each one of the consortium partners. This first phase also 
includes the development of the first immersive experience (January – December 2015); 2) 
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phase 2 is an intermediary evaluation phase in which each one of the partners is supposed to 
present their advancements to an official committee of auditors and evaluators (January – 
December 2015); and 3) phase 3 concerns the development of the second immersive experience 
and the demonstration of the achieved results by the consortium (January – July 2017). Each 
one of the two immersive experiences were tested through public events (also called 
demonstrations). The first event took place during phase 2 of the project, while the second (final 
event) took place during phase 3. Table 4 provides a description of the three phases.  
 
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Table 4 Main Phases of the R&D Research Project 
------------ 
 
3.2. Research Design and Data Sources 
The specific objectives of the paper are twofold: 1) to further develop an understanding of the 
nature of means-end decoupling work, particularly with reference to an industrial R&D project 
implementation; 2) to identify how the micro-mechanisms dynamically influence means-ends 
decoupling within an industrial R&D project implementation. The institutional outworkings of 
the industrial R&D project implementation are explored in this study and therefore evolve over 
time. Accordingly, the case material for this study derives from the three main time periods of 
the project lifetime. The first round of interviews occurred at phase 1 of the project. The project 
was initiated in January 2015. This first phase started by clarifying the intended goals of the 
project, affirming the expected outcomes for each one of the seven partners. Then after, the 
partners started developing the first immersive experience, which constitutes the first goal of 
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the project. This phase represented the most appropriate timing for us to run the first round of 
interviews. 
 
In Phase 2 (January – December 2016), the consortium had to submit and present a detailed 
report of the achieved goals and objectives at that stage by each one of the seven partners. The 
latter report was submitted and presented to a committee of official auditors and evaluators 
(goal 2), which represented a key event in the life of the project. This important phase of the 
project led us to collect the second round of interviews with the same respondents as in the first 
interview-round.  
 
The last phase (January – June 17) represents the third key event in the life of the project. That 
is the period when the partners were expected to synthesize their achievements to come up with 
concrete innovations through the development and testing of the second (final) immersive 
experience (goal 3). Accordingly, this third phase resulted in our third and last interview-round, 
again with the same set of respondents.  
 
Historical punctuations throughout the life of the project create periods within which important 
evolutions occur. Thus, we use a set of multiple sources of evidence to guide the selection of 
key work events. In addition to interviewing representatives of the seven partners from the 
consortium, we interviewed a number of experts in the field of publicly funded industrial R&D 
projects from the cluster. Other sources of evidence included: 1) archival corporate records 
(deliverables, confidential documents, administrative reviews, and emails); 2) archival public 
records (articles, industry reports, and corporate history); and 3) field observations (notes from 
the monthly meetings and informal discussions). Table 5 illustrates the employed sources of 
evidence: We have used the semi-structured interviews as the primary instrument for data 
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collection. This qualitative methodology is appropriate to unlock the micro-mechanisms over 
time, particularly when the investigated phenomenon is exploratory in nature, complex to 
capture, and represents a confluence of factors (Lee, 1999).    
 
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Table 5: Multiple sources of evidence 
------------ 
 
In the three rounds of interviews, we have interviewed 29 respondents among which 23 are 
project partners and 6 are field experts. Table 6 describes the accomplished interviews, the 
interviewees, the interview themes, and the corresponding key events and goals relevant to each 
one of the three project phases.   
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Table 6: Accomplished interviews throughout the life-time of the R&D project 
------------ 
 
First round of interviews:  
In the first interview-round, we attempted to explore whether the COI project fits the definition 
of an opaque field (Briscoe & Murphy, 2012; Bromley & Powell, 2012; Jiang & Bansal, 2003; 
Wijen, 2014) and presents an institutional field in which means-ends decoupling can occur. 
Accordingly, we asked questions regarding the general work relating to the project missions, 
expectations, and outcomes as a whole, as well as of each one of the seven partners separately. 
Further, following Bromley and Powell (2012) and Wijen (2014) argument that fields, in which 
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organisations adopt policies and implement practices that are loosely linked to their core goals, 
are favourable for means-ends decoupling to occur, we attempted to benchmark the core goals 
of the project with the core goals of the partnering firms and organizations to assess the level 
of opacity of the COI project. Appendix 1 provides the questions from the three rounds of 
interviews.  
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Appendix 1: Examples of Interview Questions 
------------ 
 
Second round of interviews 
Means-ends decoupling occurs when adopters demonstrate substantive compliance through 
deploying the necessary resources for policy implementation (Brompley & Powell, 2012; 
Wijen, 2014). Thus, the second interview-round of the cases aimed at investigating whether the 
partners have deployed the necessary resources and showed substantive implementation of the 
project’s guidelines and instructions. As this phase is characterized by an intermediary report 
by the partners, we also tried to assess whether the goals of this first phase were met as initially 
envisaged by the project developers.  
 
Third round of interviews 
Means-ends decoupling occurs when a gap emerges between implementation and achievement; 
in other terms, when policy implementation does not lead to the achievement of all the 
envisaged goals (Bromley & Powell, 2012; Wijen, 2014). The aim here is to explore first if 
indeed means-ends decoupling has occurred in the case of COI project; and then, to assess the 
institutionally embedded causes, events, and factors, as well as the partners’ causal justifications 
and plausible explanations for not achieving the intended goals. Accordingly, this last 
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interview-round was run toward the end of the project in phase 3, where the achieved 
innovations were tested and evaluated by an audience of experts and professionals. 
 
3.3 Data Collection and Analysis  
Our level of analysis is the lower-level micro-mechanisms which underlie and constitute in their 
sum the higher-level means-ends decoupling within our research setting of a publicly funded, 
industrial R&D project. Our unit of analysis are consequently the various individual actions and 
interactions, which relate to implementing and achieving the intended goals of the R&D project 
(Yin, 2017). The individual actions and interactions are contained in the different data sources 
of our study, that is, the archival records, the interviews, and our project observations. We 
specifically focused for the identification of the micro-mechanisms on the evolution and change 
of these individual actions and interactions over the time period of the three successive project 
phases. 
 
Combining top-down theorizing and inductive theory building 
We combined top-down theorizing (Lee et al., 1999; Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2011) and inductive 
theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Ridder et al., 2014) to identify the institutionally embedded 
causes and factors that led to the emergence of the means-ends gap. Combining top-down 
theorizing and inductive theory building is more appropriate when a phenomenon is not 
comprehensively understood and there is little or no built theory that explains the emerging 
relationships between relevant concepts and the mechanisms through which these relationships 
operate (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
 
The combination of these two complementary methodological approaches allowed us to rely on 
means-ends decoupling literature to develop an appropriate framework for our research. 
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Specifically, we identified in the top-down theorizing approach the central conceptual tenets for 
means-ends decoupling in the institutional literature. Our review of the literature has revealed 
the existence of three different categories of compliance barriers, that is, causal complexity, 
behavioral invisibility, and practice multiplicity. We likewise derived three categories of 
compliance inducements from the existing theory, that is, setting rules, devising incentives, and 
transfer of best practices (Wijen, 2014). We then used these categories as a framework the 
inductive theory building with our data collection and the resultant categorization of the salient 
micro-foundations underlying means-ends decoupling work in our data analysis. 
 
Design and stages of data collection 
The collection and analysis of data were performed following four main stages. In stage 1, we 
identified from the review of the literature the primary categories of data of interest for the 
investigation. The resultant semi-structured interview guideline allowed to determine the 
respondents’ causal justifications and the institutionally embedded causes for not achieving the 
intended goals. We next selected the sample of interviewees for the three successive rounds. In 
stage 2, we carried out the interviews to collect data on key categories, while tracking new ones. 
The interviews aimed at determining key patterns and mechanisms that may explain the 
occurrence of means-ends decoupling throughout the life of the project. The collected data has 
reached saturation by the end of the interviews, as no central new themes emerged in the verbal 
accounts of respondents. Thus, the findings account for most of the respondents’ reported 
behaviours.  In stage 3, we analysed the findings through identifying eventual causes and 
effects, as well as elaborating and further modifying the categories from stage 2 of the research 
process. After coding interview transcripts and key points (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1990), the obtained codes were manually stored into an open-coded database. The 
same methodological approach was followed to transcribe and code the data collected through 
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the other sources of evidence as described in Table 2.  Finally, stage 4 involved the triangulation 
of the obtained results with the other sources of evidence at hand, ensuring a replication with 
the initial sample of field experts to obtain their feedback regarding the achieved findings. The 
findings were also re-examined with topic experts of R&D management for validation and 
approval. Further, we sought feedback from several respondents from the original interviewed 
sample through subsequent informal discussions, phone calls, and emails to validate the 
obtained results. This follow-up stage validated and further detailed our main findings. 
 
Coding procedure 
In analysing the interview data and other sources of evidence, we started by implementing a 
micro-analysis, which allowed for identifying the segments of text that were relevant to the 
occurrence of means-ends decoupling. Then after, we run an inductive analysis of the 
qualitative accounts through creating a set of open-codes that classify the identified means-
decoupling causes, factors, and patterns in relevance to three compliance barriers and 
inducements. Finally, the six micro-mechanisms were inductively determined through axial-
coding, while simultaneously linking these latter to our framework, fitting each micro-
mechanism to the most relevant compliance barrier category. 
 
4. Findings 
The project COI offered important insights into identifying the micro-mechanisms that lead to 
means-ends decoupling work in the institutional outworkings of the publicly funded industrial 
R&D project. To reach a better understanding of such micro-mechanisms and the process 
through which they cause a gap between means and ends, it was important to engage in a 
dialogue with the key involved actors, understand their perspectives, and listen to their problems 
and concerns. The qualitative responses collected from the semi-structured interviews and the 
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other sources of evidence at hand helped at accomplishing the latter goal. A number of divergent 
elements, perspectives, and justifications were noted in the respondents’ accounts in explaining 
the occurrence of means-ends decoupling. 
 
Our analysis of the evidence reveals that six micro-mechanisms influence means-ends 
decoupling work of organisations in the context of an industrial R&D project implementation. 
We labelled these six cognitive mechanisms as 'Technical Complexity', 'Resource 
Underestimation', 'Revising expectations due to the lack of capabilities', 'Preserving actors’ self-
interests', 'Appearance of competing advanced technologies', and 'Rapid evolution of customer 
needs'. The figure 1 below displays the data structure underlying our identification of the six 
micro-mechanism. 
 
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Figure 1 Micro mechanisms involved in means-ends decoupling in R&D projects 
 
------------ 
 
In addition, Table 7 below summarises several representative interview quotes supporting the 
six identified micro-mechanisms. 
 
------------ 
INSERT ABOUT HERE 
Table 7 Data supporting salience of micro-mechanisms involved in means-ends 
decoupling 
------------ 
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In the following sections, we present how the gap between means and ends has evolved 
throughout the life of the industrial R&D project COI. We structured the results of this research 
along the identified categories from the literature review, namely the compliance barriers and 
inducements.  
 
4.1. Working on Causal Complexity  
The adopters of institutions, such as industrial R&D projects, are faced with uncertainty and 
ignorance that stem from the causal complexity, which cause the adopters to lack the attention 
and knowledge about the field specific rules, aspects, and issues and key drivers of substantive 
compliance. Accordingly, setting concrete and specific rules, directions, and guidelines by 
designers can minimize the causal complexity and increase chances for compliant behaviour 
for adopters. In the case of the industrial R&D project COI, the technical annex provides 
guidance and remedies improvisation. Such specific rules minimize the attention problem 
caused by causal complexity and foster compliant behaviour among the partners.  
 
While the designers of the COI project focused on establishing specific rules, guidelines, and 
instructions and clarifying the exact intended outcomes to ensure substantive compliance 
among the partners, the envisaged goals of the project were yet not achieved. Our analysis of 
the results reveals two micro-mechanisms that can potentially explain this mismatch between 
means and ends in relevance to the causal complexity barrier; namely, technical complexity and 
resources underestimation.     
 
First Related Micro-mechanism: Technical Complexity 
The COI consortium regroups companies and institutions that are specialized in a multitude of 
advanced digital technologies. The initial goal of the project was to innovate new products and 
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services through creating a synergy among all these different technologies. However, creating 
a coherence among all these various and complex technologies proved a highly challenging task 
throughout the life of the project. 
 
Our analysis of the interview accounts suggests that most of the partners under-evaluated the 
technical complexity of the products and systems to be developed. The results explain that the 
developed prototypes have a limited adaptation capacity to the other employed technologies. 
Further, no sufficient technical resources were allocated for this matter; a problem worsened by 
the limited technical capabilities available within the partnering organizations. For instance, we 
noted a comment by the representative of a partnering research institution (connected objects) 
who claims in his interview:  
“Now when I look back at the time when we were developing our product, I think we didn't care much about the 
fact that we had a set of different complex technologies that needed to function together.” (Manager of Research 
Projects, Connected Objects Institution, May 2017) 
 
Attempting to combine a multitude of technologies leaded to increased technical complexity 
among the partners, a problem hardly managed by the members of the consortium as the level 
of complexity faced exceeded the scope of their knowledge and skills and went beyond their 
zone of expertise. This technical complexity diminishes the actors’ ability to connect causes 
and effects, and increases uncertainty and ambiguity regarding the outcomes of their actions. 
 
Second Related Micro-mechanism: Resource Underestimation 
The complexity of the assigned missions in the project renders the estimation of the required 
human and financial resources a very challenging task. Thus, some of the partners 
underestimated the needed human and financial resources and could perform an exact 
estimation only after the start of the implementation process. The following notes from the 
meetings illustrate this issue: 
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“The video mapping company is in charge of developing the scenarios for the immersive experiences, but part of 
their mission according to the technical annex, is also to conceptualize the scenes for the two events. I am a bit 
surprised why they haven’t planned to engage a professional scenographer in the project.” (Manager of innovative 
projects, Augmented Reality Company, March 2016) 
 
The representative of the video mapping company replies: 
“We have not deployed such a person in our team because there is no such a competence in our firm and we would 
not hire a scenographer particularly for that matter. You all know how much that costs and frankly we didn’t think 
it would be really necessary to have a professional scenographer in our team.” (CEO, Video Mapping Company, 
March 2016) 
 
Within the same vein, the representative of the telecom institution states in his interview:  
“The provided financial resources are not sufficient to accomplish all the objectives assigned to my institution. We 
have to develop a fully operational network connecting all the employed devices in the immersive experience and 
so on … Well, we did agree on these terms at the beginning, but the overall cost of such a mission is a very 
complicated thing to estimate. It’s with the advancement of the project that we start realizing this problem of 
financial insufficiency.” (Manager of research projects, Telecommunication Institution, April 2016) 
 
These accounts suggest that the project developers, as well as the partners, have underestimated 
the needed human and financial resources for the project. Due to the technical complexity of 
the employed technologies and complexity of the suggested scenarios for the immersive 
experiences, the allocated resources turned out not sufficient to achieve the intended aims. 
 
4.2. Working at Behavioural Invisibility 
When adopters of institutions such as industrial R&D projects have a self-interest in 
noncompliance to avoid costly adaptation, behavioural invisibility allows them to conceal their 
non-compliant behaviour and escape eventual sanctions. Behavioural invisibility thus lead to a 
lack of motivation for adopters to comply. To overcome this motivation barrier the developers 
of the COI project signal that compliant partners can receive material benefits such as being 
selected for future projects and capturing value from the achieved innovations. Although such 
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compliance inducements ensure substantive compliance of the partners, intended outcomes 
were yet not achieved. We identified two micro-mechanisms that can explain the gap between 
means and ends relevant to the behavioural invisibility barrier.  
 
First Related Micro-mechanism: Revising expectations due to the lack of capabilities 
Partners in an industrial R&D project may submit misleading or untruthful proposals to conform 
to the strict selection requirements set by the evaluators and, thus, increase their chances for 
being accepted. Accordingly, they report information that may not reflect their actual 
capabilities. When partners become convinced of their inability to achieve the ends, they set 
new expectations that better fit their actual capabilities. The following interview account by the 
representative of the tourism institution illustrates the latter point:  
“What we can conclude from the collected feedback of the participants is mainly the deceiving character of the 
offered immersive experience offered by our team (first event). It is important to emphasize that our performance 
didn’t meet the expectations of the professional audience that constituted the vastest majority of the present 
audience … This audience of professionals from the field of events management turned to be a highly expert and 
knowledgeable audience about the fields of immersion, interactivity, connectivity, and so on. Considering the level 
of this first demonstration, it would be essential to review or even lower the expectations of the project for the 
second (final) demonstration that would be characterized by an even more exigent and demanding audience.” CEO, 
Tourism Institution, April 2016) 
 
In the implementation process, the partners became more aware of their actual capabilities and 
more rational about their ability to reach the initially intended outcomes. Thus, they become 
compelled to review or even lower their expectations for the project’s final outcomes. This 
element of behavioural invisibility allowed partners to lower their expectations without the risk 
of being faced with eventual sanctions. 
 
Second Related Micro-mechanism: Preserving actors’ self-interests  
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Different conflicting interests exist among the partners of the consortium. Because they know 
that their behaviours can hardly be observed and assessed, each one of the partnering 
organizations tended to behave in ways that best preserve its own internal interests. For instance, 
the leader of the COI project points to this issue in his interview; he states:  
“One of the main challenges that we have faced in this project and that I believe had impacted to a certain extant 
our ability to achieve the project’s intended outcomes, is the fact that the partners have realized toward the end of 
the project that following the exact instructions of the project may not serve and can conflict with their own 
interests. So, whenever an important decision had to be made regarding the project, each representative tried to 
make sure that the interests of his organization comes first.” (Head of the project COI, Transmission of Audio-
visual Content Company, June 2017) 
 
In such a context where multiple actors may have different or even conflicting self-interests, 
this element of behavioural invisibility enables the partners to behave in ways that best serve 
their interests, without being tracked or sanctioned. 
 
4.3. Working with Practice Multiplicity 
Actors operating in institutional fields that are underlined by a multitude of divergent practices 
and heterogeneous routines, such as industrial R&D projects, find it difficult to make sense of 
practice diversity and engage in compliant behaviour. The ambiguity that stems from practice 
multiplicity leads to a lack of attention and knowledge about which one of the various coexisting 
practices results in substantive compliance. While the developers of the COI project offered 
implementation options and enabled capacity building through transfer of best practices to clear 
this compliance barrier, we found that the project has failed to attain its intended goals. Our 
findings suggest the existence of two micro-mechanisms that explain the means-ends gap 
relevant to the practice multiplicity barrier; namely, appearance of competing advanced 
technologies and rapid evolution of customers’ needs.  
 
First Related Micro-mechanism: Appearance of competing advanced technologies 
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At some point during the implementation process, the COI partners have realized that other 
R&D projects that operate within the same field have achieved better results that exceed the 
intended goals of the COI project. This has resulted in a state of frustration and deception among 
the partners as the latter development jeopardizes the innovative character of their products and 
services and minimizes the possibility for commercialization. Analysing the data from the 
public records at hand, we noted that a recent industry report investigating industrial R&D 
projects within the field of immersion and interactivity has reported the creation of systems that 
allow high levels of immersion and interactivity for audiences in entertainment sectors. These 
accomplishments exceeded the intended objectives of the COI project.  A relevant account to 
this micro-mechanism was raised by the representative of the business model’s institution who 
argues:  
"We were not able to build a strong business model as expected, mainly because the value proposition of the 
developed system already exists in the market and the immersive experiences offered by our competitors better fit 
the current needs of customers." (Senior Consultant, Business Models Institution, March 2017) 
 
These accounts taken together suggest the competitive nature of industrial R&D projects within 
the immersion and interactivity field. The COI partners were faced with a multitude of divergent 
practices and heterogeneous routines, as other R&D projects might have implemented different 
practices and routines to achieve the same ends. Indeed, as revealed by our results, competing 
advanced technologies by other industrial R&D projects appeared in the market, causing a 
certain frustration and deception among the COI partners. The ambiguity that stems from 
practice multiplicity made it difficult for the COI partners to identify which one of the various 
coexisting practices leads to goal achievement, causing the project to lose its innovative and 
state-of-the-art character.  
 
Second related Micro-mechanism: Rapid evolution of customer needs 
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Immersion and interactivity are rapidly changing sectors, characterized by a significant number 
of subsequent innovations and developments. The COI partners could not keep track of the 
newly emerging needs of customers, making it difficult for the project to catch up with the fast-
changing evolutions of the market. For example, an expert from the field of digital event 
management states:  
"As an expert in event management, I can tell you that audiences nowadays are becoming more and more 
demanding, particularly because they are faced with a huge number of highly diversified offers from all these 
different types of actors in the field of digital innovation. So, we have noticed through our years of experience, 
that the needs of customers in this field evolve so fast that most companies have a hard time to follow."  
 
A similar comment, that was noted in one of the meetings, illustrates this element of rapid 
change of customer needs:  
"This project (COI) is a long one that undergoes for 3 years. Maybe we should have kept asking people what they 
wanted throughout the life of the project so that we can make sure that what we have done through this period fits 
their expectations." (Senior Consultant, Business Models Institution, March 2017)  
 
In the COI project, a needs assessment for customers in the entertainment sectors was 
accomplished at the beginning of the project, but was not pursued over the life of the project. 
As the project runs over 3 years, this assessment needed to be updated on a regular basis as it 
operates in a rapidly evolving sector. Thus, partners lost track of the newly emerging needs of 
customers, resulting in a less competitive offer by the project. Practice multiplicity that 
underlies industrial R&D projects caused the COI partners to lack the attention and knowledge 
about the exact practices that can lead to goal achievement, leading a gap between means and 
ends. 
 
5. Discussion – Working in the Gap 
Newton et al. (2014: 747) noted that “the means by which organizational units act to resolve 
potential contradictions in the demands placed upon them has attracted surprisingly little 
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attention within the marketing discipline”. Research show that contradictions in the demands 
placed on managers can get in the way of work getting done.  These institutional contradictions 
are particularly evident in multinational subunits (Newton et al., 2014), price-fixing cartels 
(Pressey & Vanharanta, 2016) and also the implementation-strategy gaps associated with 
marketing innovation work. But do such institutional contradictions always get in the way? In 
this study, we sought to understand  R&D project implementation and why it failed to achieve 
the intended goals. That is, why adopters, which are provided with clear inducements and 
sufficient resources, still fail frequently to achieve the intended institutional goals. In doing so, 
we examined how actors engaged in institutional means-end decoupling. Means-ends 
decoupling work therefore represents an important theoretical concept in understanding how 
managers leverage institutional contradictions in their industrial work. At the heart of this work 
approach is viewing implementation as a dynamic social practice. The institutional means-end 
decoupling work provides a renewed focus on the social practice associated business to business 
interactions with institutionalization, rather than the traditional view of institutions as reified 
social structures with docile agents. Our main evidence-based contribution is the identification 
of six distinct micro-mechanisms, which underlie and constitute in their sum the higher-level 
phenomenon of means-ends decoupling in a publicly funded industrial R&D project. 
Consequently, the  six distinct micro-mechanisms collectively serve to allow for the fluid 
switching of work as the institutional conditions permit. Our findings have important 
implications for theory and practice.   
 
5.1. Implications for Theory and Practice 
Our findings on means-ends decoupling work have important implications for understanding 
business networks. Our findings move us some way towards understanding how market actors 
accommodate different, sometimes competing or contradictory, pressures and goals in R&D 
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project implementation. An institutional means-end decoupling work approach offers useful 
research complementarities, linking system-level goal studies (Matinheikki et al., 2016; Möller 
& Rajala, 2007), with implementation gap research (Rapert, Velliquette, & Garretson, 2002; 
Leischnig et al. 2017). Whenever the industrial R&D project fails to reach the intended system-
level goals, question marks are invariably raised in relation to implementation (Aarikka-
Stenroos, et al. 2017; Medlin & Törnroos, 2014). An institutional decoupling work approach 
provides a new way of understanding implementation gaps where competent network actors 
inhabit and maintain project implementation gaps. These findings deepen extant understandings 
of the workings of implementation gaps, leveraging vertical trust spaces (Newton et al., 2014), 
impression management tactics (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992), and creating and maintaining price-
fixing cartels (Pressey et al., 2014). R&D project implementation also sheds light on the 
remarkable plasticity of business network institutions. As Strambach (2010:414) explains, 
plasticity permits “variation in the attachment of new elements to existing institutions, the slow 
rise of peripheral meanings to dominant institutions and their conversion by the redeployment 
of old institutions to new purposes.” Such institutions are therefore not iron cages, with precise 
goals that cannot be stretched to accommodate business network diversity and work.  
 
Another important implication of our study concerns the identification of the six micro-
mechanisms. We find that these micro-mechanisms contribute to maintaining project 
implementation gaps, while simultaneously complying to the institutional regime. Our study 
supports how discrete combinations of micro-mechanisms can determine the nature of means-
ends decoupling work. Prior studies in means-ends decoupling literature primarily focused on 
macro-level conditions and factors impacting institutional regimes and fields, in which 
compliance adopters are situated (Levy & Lichtenstein; 2012; Espinosa & Walker; 2011; 
Aravind & Christmann, 2011; O’Rourke, 2007; Young, 2012; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). In 
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this study, we have taken the reverse research direction, by identifying and aggregating lower-
level micro-mechanisms in our model and by empirically validating their relevance with 
reference to the broad spectrum of actor-based and firm-based data sources in our case research. 
It is important to draw this distinction as we have seen how different micro-mechanisms can 
serve to allow for the fluid switching of means-end decoupling work as the institutional 
conditions permit. 
 
An equally important implication of our study analysis is the way that it uncovers the linkage 
between the lower-level mechanisms and the nature of the actual industrial project work.  In 
particular, our findings show how such micro-mechanisms hold causal powers over the nature 
of that work, where traditional project rules do not always apply or work in vague institutional 
settings. By implication, then, there is always ‘wriggle room’ in the work directed towards 
institutional goals, regardless of the scrutiny that that implementation gap brings. This means 
going beyond the all-or-nothing assessment or where some but not all intended outcomes of 
implementation are achieved.  
 
Finally, our study investigated the phenomenon of means-ends decoupling in the institutional 
field of a publicly funded, industrial R&D project, which was financed by a national French 
funding scheme. The research setting of the large majority of studies is to date situated in 
contexts of marketing information systems and sales promotions (Noble & Mokwa, 1999), 
corporate social responsibility (Crilly, 2012; Wijen 2014), or channel changes  (Sarin et al., 
2012). This study complements and broadens the empirical scope for research on means-ends 
decoupling, building upon a stream of industrial marketing literature on the workings of project 
networks and implementation work (Blomquist & Wilson, 2007; Cova & Salle, 2007; Mele, 
2011; Canhoto, Quinton, Jackson, & Dibb, 2016).  
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So how should practitioners interpret the findings? Rather than viewing goal-setting as a one-
off salve for boasting R&D project performance and implementation, we suggest that managers 
might wish to think about the R&D project design in a way increases extra-institutional 
behaviours. For example, to consider how individual project leadership, evaluators and 
investors, along with different institutional regimes, can frequently discuss and bring different 
emphasises and different weight on selection criteria that can increase or decrease partner 
flexibility, technical capabilities and resources. Second, to attenuate the ‘resources 
underestimation’ micro-mechanism, R&D projects’ designers might consider the institutional 
maintenance required to enable a continuous follow-up of the partners throughout the project 
life-time. Thus, investors can make the necessary adjustments to fill unanticipated needs in 
terms of human and financial resources.  
 
Our results have revealed that the two micro-mechanisms relevant to ‘revising expectations due 
to the lack of capabilities’ and ‘preserving actors’ self-interests’ are mainly due to the 
motivation barrier caused by ‘behavioural invisibility’. The lack of visibility among actors, 
incentivize them to act in ways that best serve their self-interests. Thus, for institutional 
entrepreneurs to downplay these two micro-mechanisms, perhaps a combination of autonomy, 
engagement and reward, invitation and event involvement and evaluation could be undertaken 
to recognise individual actions that take advantage of field opacity.     
 
In designing industrial R&D projects, developers might consider taking into account the highly 
competitive and rapidly changing nature of the institutional field. To overcome the micro-
mechanism relevant to the ‘appearance of competing advanced technologies’, the R&D project 
should be implemented in a way that preserve the innovative aspect of the innovations. This 
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can be achieved through a continuous monitoring of the competing R&D projects and state-of-
the-art technologies. Further, considering the rapidly changing evolution of markets, the project 
partners should implement continuous needs assessment studies to capture the newly emergent 
customer needs over the life of the project, and accordingly adopt their innovations to these new 
customer needs.   
 
Taken together, these practical recommendations can serve as actionable directions for projects’ 
developers and partners to overcome the means-ends decoupling micro-mechanisms and, 
accordingly, create improved conditions for goal achievement. 
 
5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
Our study has some limitations that present opportunities for future research. We identify three 
broader categories of means-end decoupling work along with six micro-mechanisms. First, we 
discussed the respective linkages of the six micro-mechanisms to the theoretically informed 
aggregate levels of the compliance barriers. Building on these insights, further studies can draw 
upon an institutional approach to build a more comprehensive validation of our empirically 
grounded model and gain a more detailed understanding of how internal and external factors 
affect the occurrence of means-ends decoupling works in opaque fields. Arguably this is not an 
exhaustive list of the type of means-end decoupling work used. Future studies might consider 
the follow-on work from means-end decoupling. That is, exploring the nature of the recoupling 
work to make adjustments, improve and sustain the R&D project implementation legitimacy. 
 
Second, as our research was situated in the context of a publicly funded, cooperative R&D 
project, it raises the question of whether and to which degree we can generalize our findings to 
other field conditions. However, we designed our case research to develop theory on the 
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phenomenon of decoupling in the setting of industrial R&D projects. So, the main study purpose 
is to provide an analytic generalization, that is, to provide with a fine-grained analysis of 
qualitative evidence deep insights into phenomenon of interest by linking our results and 
implications back to theory (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2017). Building on our work, 
future empirical studies could explore how different fields might comprise different types of 
micro-mechanisms, which might in turn lead to variations in the nature of means-end 
decoupling work, and in alternate manifestations of the phenomenon.  In addition, future 
research might consider the extreme loss of legitimacy in R&D project implementation where 
the project is unworkable or written off or where the field conditions view it as entirely 
illegitimate. There is therefore the need to search for further mechanisms that explain observed 
means-end decoupling work. 
 
Third, while our study evidence tentatively suggests that the six micro-mechanisms link 
together in the occurrence of the higher-level means-ends decoupling phenomenon, the 
empirical grounding of these linkages and their causal effects are beyond the scope of our 
evidence base and our analytic approach. In consequence, the further uncovering of interactions 
and causal effects of micro-mechanisms, as well as the temporal unfolding of the diverse micro-
mechanisms in the materialisation of means-ends decoupling work, provide promising 
perspectives for future research. 
 
Finally, an interesting avenue for research to address the question of how firms may limit the 
occurrence of means-ends decoupling would be to examine the potential of new technologies 
in industrial settings. For example, the emergence of metrics and big data mining in the 
advertising industry has considerably reduced the opacity of how investment dollars lead to 
advertising performance. New audience tracking technologies have provided more accurate 
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metrics to calculate the returns on investment of advertising campaigns, which increases the 
coupling of means and ends for advertisers. In high-technology driven industries, new 
technologies may help firms optimize some of the mechanisms to couple means and ends. 
Therefore, investigating how new technologies may impact means-ends decoupling in 
technology-driven industries would be a promising research. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Summary of implementation themes relevant to the focus of the study 
Theme Description and illustrative studies Implication for implementation goals and 
gaps 
Pressures of 
implementation  
Implementation as a set of changes in 
the institutional environment. 
External, internal, outcome pressures.  
Power and resources (Dibb & Simkin, 
2000), legitimacy with customers and 
stakeholders (Newton, Ewing & 
Collier, 2014). 
Gaps in the market, policy and goal 
alignment and fit. 
Institutions are rigid and prevent 
implementation goals 
Devise normative solutions, preventing the 
gaps, or closing them. 
Existence of competing and contradictory 
goals. Trade-offs between legitimacy at the 
expense of efficiency 
Questions on how to define success. 
Opaque R&D 
implementation  
Types of structures (e.g. new 
divisions, new projects, new 
technologies), and change in 
structures (rules, norms, values) and 
agency (individual management) 
across institutional R&D ecosystems 
(Song & Song, 2010; Huikkola et al. 
2013; Yao et al., 2014; Perkmann et 
al., 2013; Ngugi et al., 2010; Raasch 
& Hippel, 2013). 
Nature of R&D ecosystem influences 
‘making the gap’. 
Formalization leads to more conformity and 
goal deviance.  
Lower levels of normative enforcement in 
high-performing teams. 
R&D autonomy defines goals and 
encourages more playfulness. 
Institutional 
work as 
implementation   
Implementation comprises both the 
highly visible and dramatic and the 
invisible and mundane, as in the day-
to-day adjustments, adaptations and 
comprises. Implementation as 
negotiation and bargaining (Pressey & 
Vanharanta, 2016; Pressey et al., 
2014; Pressey & Ashton, 2009), loose 
coupling (Newton, Ewing, and 
Collier, 2014) and decoupling (Yang 
& Su, 2014). 
 
 
Institutional gaps are inhabited by 
individuals. 
Institutions are elastic and permit the 
stretching of implementation goals  
Stretching of institutional arrangements can 
accommodate different, sometimes 
competing or contradictory, pressures and 
goals 
The ‘social skill’ of individuals working in 
the gaps and the making of those gaps.    
Institutions are stretched with trade-off in 
the gap pressures. 
Decoupling as part of institutional work. 
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Table 2: Compliance barriers and compliance inducements influencing means-ends decoupling 
Factors 
Influencing 
Compliance 
Key Dimensions 
of Compliance 
Factors 
Baseline Definition of Key Elements Related Literature 
Compliance 
Barriers 
Causal 
complexity 
 interactions between multiple heterogeneous actors, factors, and effects 
 lead to uncertainty about cause-effect relations and the nature of the 
institutional field 
 result in the lack of knowledge about drivers of substantive compliance 
Levy & Lichtenstein 
(2012); Espinosa & 
Walker (2011); Davis, 
Eisenhardt, & Bingham 
(2009); Orton & Weick 
(1990) 
Behavioural 
invisibility 
 actors maintain a low profile, refrain from accepting external control, 
and locate in remote areas 
 observing and measuring actor behavior becomes difficult 
 leads to a lack of motivation for adopters to comply 
Aravind & Christmann, 
(2011); O’Rourke, (2007); 
Jiang & Bansal, (2003); 
Howard et al. (2000) 
Practice 
multiplicity 
 multitude of divergent practices and heterogeneous routines in field  
 creates ambiguity about which practices result in substantive 
compliance 
 makes organisational engagement in compliant behavior difficult 
Young, (2012); Santos & 
Eisenhardt (2009) 
Compliance 
Inducements 
Setting rules  a set of concrete and specific rules, directions, and guidelines 
 cause actors not to pay attention to the field-specific regulations 
 counteracts the uncertainty of causal complexity 
Okhmatovskiy & David, 
(2012); Donaldson & 
Dunfee, (1994) 
 Devising 
incentives 
 creation of specific incentives and signals of future benefits 
 opposes the lack of motivation resulting from behavioural invisibility 
 leverages the benefits of compliance adopters 
O’Rourke, (2007); King et 
al., (2005) 
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 Transferring 
practices 
 providing variety of implementation options 
 enabling capacity building through the transfer of best practice 
 counters the lack of knowledge resulting from practice multiplicity 
Perez-Aleman, (2011; 
Terlaak, 2007) 
 
Table 3: Participating Organisations in R&D Project Consortium  
 
Profile of Partners Main Field of expertise 
Partner 1 (Connected Objects 
Institution) 
Developing connected objects that allow a high level of interaction among the members of an audience or 
among different groups of audiences. 
Partner 2 (Tourism Institution) Elaborating and managing cultural events and scientific conferences for both public and professional audiences. 
Partner 3 (Telecommunication 
Institution) 
Developing networks that can allow a low-cost fluid connectivity among a significant number of 
connected objects. 
Partner 4 (Transmission of 
audio-visual content company) Transmitting ultra-HD audio-visual content with lower costs and minimum latency. 
Partner 5 (Business Models 
Institution) Creating innovative business models that allow the commercialization of innovative products and services. 
Partner 6 (Video Mapping 
company) 
Using video mapping technologies to revolutionize the scenography of spaces and create immersive 
experiences. 
Partner 7 (Augmented Reality 
company) 
Using augmented reality technologies to enable virtual interaction among distant audiences and create 
immersive experiences.  
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Table 4: Main Phases of the R&D Research Project 
 
Main 
Phases  
Time 
Periods Description of the Missions 
Phase 1 
January - 
December 
2015 
Launching of the project and the clarification of the outcomes expected gto be achieved by each one of the 
consortium partners. Goal 1: Development of the first immersive experience.   
Phase 2 
January - 
December 
2016 
An intermediary evaluation phase in which each one of the partners is supposed to present their advancements to 
an official committee of auditors and evaluators. Goal 2: Meeting the evaluators’ expectations and correcting 
potential problems with the first immersive experience.  
Phase 3 January - July 2017 
Goal 3: Developing the second immersive experience and presenting a demonstration of the achieved results and 
innovations by the consortium to an audience of experts and evaluators.   
Table 5: Multiple sources of evidence 
Interviews Archival Records Field Observations 
Number  Respondents Number Records Number Observations 
23 Partners' 
representatives 
12 Corporate: deliverables, confidential documents, 
business plans, administrative reviews, and emails 
28 notes from the monthly meetings, 
and informal discussions 
6 Field experts 16 Public: articles, videos, industry reports, and corporate 
history 
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Table 6: Accomplished interviews throughout the life-time of the R&D project 
Phases  Key Events and Goals of the Project Interview Themes Number of Interviews Total Respondents 
Phase 1 - 1st 
round of 
interviews 
Launching of the project and the 
clarification of the outcomes expected to be 
achieved by each one of the consortium 
partners. Goal 1: Development of the first 
immersive experience.   
Questions regarding the missions, 
expectations, and outcomes of the 
project. A comparison the core 
goals of the project with the core 
goals of the partnering 
organizations. 
1 representative of each one 
of the seven partners (n=7) 
and 3 experts from the field 
of industrial R&D projects 
from the cluster (n=3) 
n=10 
Phase 2 - 
2nd round 
of interviews 
An intermediary evaluation phase in which 
each one of the partners is supposed to 
present their advancements to an official 
committee of auditors and evaluators. Goal 
2: Meeting the evaluators’ expectations and 
correcting potential problems with the first 
immersive experience.  
Assessing the advancements of the 
partners toward achieving the 
project’s goals. Questions regarding 
the results reported to the evaluators 
and the extent to which these results 
were actually accomplished.   
10 representatives of the 
project partners (n=10) and 
2 experts from the field of 
professional and cultural 
events management (n=2) 
n=12 
Phase 3 - 
3rd round of 
interviews 
Goal 3: Developing the second immersive 
experience and presenting a demonstration 
of the achieved results and innovations to an 
audience of experts and evaluators.   
Assessing the success or failure to 
achieve the intended outcomes. 
Questions regarding the factors that 
leaded to the actual outcomes.  
6 partners (n=6) and 1 
expert from the field of 
industrial R&D projects 
(n=1) 
n=7 
 
Table 7 Data supporting salience of micro-mechanisms involved in means-ends decoupling 
Aggregate 
Dimension 
2nd Order Themes Representative quotes from the interviews and other sources of evidence Source of evidence 
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Causal 
complexity 
work 
Technical complexity “Now when I look back at the time when we were developing our product, I think we didn't care 
much about the fact that we had a set of different complex technologies that needed to function 
together.”  
Interview: Manager of Research Projects, 
Partner 1 (Connected Objects Institution), 
May 2017.  
  “The employed technologies in the project COI are very complex and their synergy may be 
counterproductive, while the use of such technologies independently from each other can 
provide a more valuable outcome than combining them together.”  
Confidential document, deliverable: 
Senior Consultant, Partner 5 (Business 
Models Institution), February 2016.  
  “Employing a number of state-of-the art-technologies including augmented reality, connected 
objects, immersion, interactivity, internet of objects, and high-quality transmission of audio-
visual content, the main goal of the project is to innovate experiences that allow extreme levels 
of immersion and interactivity among audiences in various entertainment sectors.” 
Confidential document: Technical annex 
of the project.  
  “The challenge was not about developing innovative products; it was rather about developing 
products that have a sufficient adaptation capacity to the other technologies … I think many of 
us (partners) didn't have the necessary technical resources and capabilities internally to 
overcome this problem of complexity.” 
Interview: Head of the project COI, 
Partner 4 (Transmission of audio-visual 
content company), April 2017.  
 Resources 
underestimation 
“The video mapping company is in charge of developing the scenarios for the immersive 
experiences, but part of their mission according to the technical annex, is also to conceptualize 
the scenes for the two events. I am a bit surprised why they haven't planned to engage a 
professional scenographer in the project.” 
Notes from the meetings: Manager of 
innovative projects, Partner 7 
(Augmented Reality company), March 
2016.  
  “We haven't deployed such a person (professional scenographer) in our team because there is no 
such a competence in our firm and we would not hire a scenographer particularly for that 
matter. You all know how much that costs and frankly we didn’t think it would be really 
necessary to have a professional scenographer in our team.” 
Notes from the meetings: CEO, Partner 6 
(Video Mapping company), March 2016.  
  “The provided financial resources are not sufficient to accomplish all the objectives assigned to 
my institution. We have to develop a fully operational network connecting all the employed 
devices in the immersive experience and so on … Well, we did agree on these terms at the 
beginning, but the overall cost of such a mission is a very complicated thing to estimate. It’s 
with the advancement of the project that we start realizing this problem of financial 
insufficiency.” 
Interview: Manager of research projects, 
Partner 3 (Telecommunication 
Institution), April 2016.  
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Aggregate 
Dimension 
2nd Order Themes Representative quotes from the interviews and other sources of evidence Source of evidence 
Behavioural 
invisibility 
work 
Revising expectations 
due to the lack of 
capabilities 
“What we can conclude from the collected feedback of the participants is mainly the deceiving 
character of the offered immersive experience offered by our team (first event). It is important 
to emphasize that our performance didn’t meet the expectations of the professional audience 
that constituted the vastest majority of the present audience." 
Interview: CEO, Partner 2 
(Tourism Institution), April 
2016.   
  “This audience of professionals from the field of event management turned to be a highly expert 
and knowledgeable audience in the field of immersion, interactivity, connectivity, and so on. 
Considering the level of this first demonstration, it would be essential to review or even lower 
the expectations of the project for the second (final) demonstration that would be characterized 
by an even more exigent and demanding audience.”  
Interview: CEO, Partner 2 
(Tourism Institution), April 
2016. 
  “Guys seriously, we are miles away from the initial goals, we have got to do something about 
this … Given our current capabilities, I don't see that happening.”  
Notes from the meetings: Head 
of the project COI, Partner 4 
(Transmission of audio-visual 
content company), May 2016.  
 Preserving actors' 
self-interests 
“One of the main challenges that we have faced in this project and that I believe had impacted 
to a certain extant our ability to achieve the project’s intended outcomes, is the fact that the 
partners have realized toward the end of the project that following the exact instructions of the 
project may not serve and can conflict with their own interests. So, whenever an important 
decision had to be made regarding the project, each representative tried to make sure that the 
interests of his organization comes first.”   
Interview: Head of the project 
COI, Partner 4 (Transmission 
of audio-visual content 
company), June 2017. 
 
 
“Working toward the same goal in the project doesn't mean that we have no differences … 
When seven people (partners) try to achieve a consensus, I can tell you that's not a friendly 
discussion.” 
Interview: Senior Consultant, 
Partner 5 (Business Models 
Institution), May 2015.  
  “In all my years of experience as a project (industrial R&D project) developer, I have never 
seen someone (partner) being sanctioned because they haven't accomplished their missions … 
there is very little control so they (partners) do pretty much what serves their best interests.” 
Interview: Field expert 
(Cluster), Designer of 
industrial R&D projects, June 
2017.  
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Aggregate 
Dimension 
2nd Order Themes Representative quotes from the interviews and other sources of evidence Source of evidence 
Practice 
multiplicity 
work 
Appearance of 
competing advanced 
technologies 
"We weren't able to build a strong business model as expected, mainly because the value 
proposition of the developed system already exists in the market and the immersive experiences 
offered by our competitors better fit the current needs of customers."  
Interview: Senior Consultant, 
Partner 5 (Business Models 
Institution), March 2017. 
  "The initial idea was to commercialize something which is highly innovative. How are we 
supposed to do the same for an already existing product and knowing that what we have 
achieved (in the project) does not even compete properly with the existing offer."  
Interview: Senior Consultant, 
Partner 5 (Business Models 
Institution), March 2017. 
  A recent research that investigates industrial R&D projects within the field of immersion and 
interactivity have reported the creation of systems that allow high levels of immersion and 
interactivity for audiences in entertainment sectors. These achievements exceed the intended 
objectives of the project COI.  
Archival records: Public 
document, Industry report, 
February 2017.  
 
 
"Don't worry guys, we need to keep on … I know it's a bit frustrating and deceiving to know 
that someone else out there is proposing nicer things, but we can always have a good 
contribution through our work.” 
Note from the meetings: 
Manager of research projects, 
Partner 3 (Telecommunication 
Institution), March 2017. 
 Rapid evolution of 
customer needs 
"As an expert in event management, I can tell you that audiences nowadays are becoming more 
and more demanding, particularity because they are faced with a huge number of highly 
diversified offers from all these different types of actors in the field of digital innovation. So, 
we have noticed through our years of experience, that the needs of customers in this field evolve 
so fast that most companies have a hard time to follow.” 
Interview: Field expert (Digital 
event management), April 
2017.   
  "This project is a long one that undergoes for 3 years. Maybe we should have kept asking 
people what they wanted throughout the life of the project so that we could make sure that what 
we have done through this period fits their expectations." 
Interview: Senior Consultant, 
Partner 5 (Business Models 
Institution), March 2017. 
 
 
"People living in digital cities are driven by a growing need for living immersive experiences 
that can allow high levels of collective emotions. Our needs assessment has revealed an 
increasingly growing number of actors operating in this field and attempting to respond to fill 
this growing gap, resulting in a subsequent number of disruptive innovations in the 
entertainment and leisure sectors.” 
Confidential document, 
deliverable: Partner 6 (Video 
Mapping company), Februrary 
2016.  
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Figure 1 Micro mechanisms involved in means-ends decoupling in R&D projects 
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Appendix 1: Examples of Interview Questions 
First round of interviews  
1) If you compare the core goals of the project work and the core goals of your organization, do you think that there is a gap or there is a match between the two?  
2) In case you think there is a gap between the two, would you lean toward achieving the goals of the project work or toward achieving the goals of your organization?  
3) Given the resources allocated to your organization, do you think your team will be able to achieve all the goals assigned to them by the project work?  
4) In case you have pressure from both the project work and your organization to achieve both parties’ goals. How would you deal with such a situation?  
 
Second round of interview:  
1) To what extent your team is moving toward the intended goals of the project work, as agreed upon at the beginning of the project?  
2) Have you deployed all the necessary resources for implementing the project’s guidelines and instructions?  
3) Knowing that the reception of the remaining part of your funding is dependent on the results of the intermediary report, have you reported the actual results achieved 
by your team?  
4) In case there was initially a gap between the core goals of the project work and the core goals of your organization, do you see yourself leaning toward achieving the 
goals assigned to you by the project? Or do you always put the achievement of your organization’s core goals at first?    
5) Do you think that the means (practices) and ends (outcomes) of the project work are maintaining distinct trajectories throughout the first phase of the project? 
6) What do you think would be the reasons behind such a gap? 
7) How do you plan to manage the pressures of the project work and your organization for the last phase of the project work? 
 
Third round of interviews  
1) Was the project work in your opinion a failure or a success, if you would have to choose between the two answers? 
2) What were the factors and elements that might have impacted this success or failure?  
3) If you have another opportunity to take part in a similar project work, what work would you do differently to increase the chances for the project’s success?   
